This paper considers a class of wireline networks, derived from the well-known butterfly network, over which two independent unicast sessions take place simultaneously. The main objectives are to understand when network coding type of operations are beneficial with and without security considerations and to derive the gains that cooperation among sources and sinks can bring. Towards these goals, the capacity region of the butterfly network with arbitrary edge capacities is first derived. It is then shown that no rate can be guaranteed over this network under security considerations, when an eavesdropper wiretaps any one link. Four variations of the butterfly network, such as the case of co-located sources, are analyzed and their secure and non-secure capacity regions are characterized.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding, as introduced in [1] , considers a network with unit capacity edges, where a source multicasts information to N receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve; the main result is that if the min-cut to each receiver equals h, and Eve wiretaps at most k edges, by using coding operations we can securely multicast at rate h − k. There has been significant work since, on building efficient coding schemes [2] , designing algorithms [3] and considering more general networks with unequal capacities, feedback and errors [4] , [5] . However, there has not been a similar understanding for multiple unicast sessions. This is not surprising: the characterization of the (unsecure) capacity of multiple unicast networks is a long-standing open problem, even for two unicast sessions. For instance, in [6] the authors proved that solving the 2-unicast problem (for general rate pairs) is as hard as solving the k-unicast problem, with k ≥ 3; in [7] necessary and sufficient conditions were derived to achieve the point (1, 1) but unfortunately do not appear to easily generalize to other pairs; and linear coding, although sufficient for multicasting, turns out not to suffice for multiple unicast networks [8] , [6] . Thus, we cannot expect a general and elegant characterization as was in the case for multicasting.
However, we believe that there is a number of questions that would be interesting to start exploring. A first question we can ask is: what network coding operations could be beneficial for security? A simple scheme is to apply secure network coding individually to each unicast session, and timeshare across sessions. This scheme may not always be optimal: there are concrete examples, where network coding The work of the authors was partially funded by NSF under award 1321120. G. K. Agarwal is also supported by the Guru Krupa Fellowship. is necessary to achieve the unsecure capacity [9] , suggesting that coding should be needed for secure communication over these networks as well. But would these (the operations that contribute to the unsecure rate) be the only coding operations we need to do? Another question we can ask is: how does the secure capacity compare to the unsecure capacity when we have multiple unicast sessions? Finally, can source or sink cooperation significantly help with the secure capacity?
To answer these questions, we analyze the celebrated butterfly network, in the general case where the edge capacities are arbitrary. We assume that an eavesdropper, Eve, wiretaps any one edge of the network (since removing two edges always disconnects at least one of the two unicast sessions, this is the only meaningful setup for us to consider). We derive secure and non-secure capacity results for four cases: (i) the traditional case in Fig. 1; (ii) the case of co-located sources in Fig. 2; (iii) the case of co-located sinks in Fig. 3 ; and (iv) a modified version of the butterfly network in Fig. 4 .
We make several observations. First, there exist error free networks for which coding across sessions is not necessary in absence of security, but it becomes of fundamental importance under security constraints. This observation is in line with our recent work in [10] that focused on networks with erasures and feedback (the coding schemes there were tailored to erasures and do not extend to the cases we examine in this paper). Second, we find that when the edge capacities are uniform, both the cases of co-located sources and of co-located sinks achieve unsecure single rates (respectively, sum-rate) that are up to 2 times (respectively, 1.5 times) those achieved in the classical butterfly network. These gains might become unbounded for general edge capacities. Moreover, both the cases of co-located sources and of co-located sinks allow for secure communication, which can not be guaranteed over the classical butterfly network. Finally, we note that, although our results apply to butterfly networks, it is possible to use them as building blocks to design schemes for larger networks, by means of a similar approach as in [11] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we define our setup. In Section III we derive our main result, namely we characterize the capacity for the four networks in Table I with and without security considerations. Finally, in Section IV we draw conclusions and we briefly discuss how these results can be used to design high-throughput achieving transmission schemes for a general multiple unicast network. Some of the proofs can be found in the extended version of this paper [12] .
II. SETUP
A wireline network is represented by a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E), where V is the vertex (node) set and E is the set of directed edges. Each edge e ∈ E represents a noiseless orthogonal channel of capacity C e . If an edge e ∈ E connects a node i to a node j, we refer to node i as the tail and to node j as the head of the edge e. For each node v ∈ V, we define I(v) as the set of all incoming edges of node v and O(v) as the set of all outgoing edges of node v.
For a two unicast system, there are two source nodes S 1 and S 2 and two sink (destination) nodes D 1 and D 2 . These source and destination nodes can be co-located, i.e., the two sources or/and the two destinations can be gathered together in a single node. Each source has an independent message that has to be communicated to the corresponding destination. We are interested in the rates at which these messages can be reliably communicated with and without security constraints.
Source S i , i ∈ [1 : 2] has a message W i that has to be reliably decoded at node D i . The messages W 1 and W 2 are independent, uniformly drawn from a finite alphabet set and are of q-ary entropy rates R 1 and R 2 , respectively. Each channel is a discrete noiseless channel accepting alphabets over F q . The symbol transmitted (respectively, received) over n channel uses on edge e ∈ E is denoted as X n e (respectively, Y n e ). Clearly, since channels are noiseless, Y ei = X ei , ∀i ∈ [1 : n].
is said to be achievable if there exist a block length n, a set of encoding functions f e , ∀e ∈ E, such that with i ∈ [1 : 2]
, and a set of two decoding functions ϕ j for j ∈ [1 : 2] , such that destination D j can decode W j with high probability, i.e., Pr (ϕ j ({Y n ℓ : ℓ ∈ I (D j )}) ̸ = W j ) < nϵ n , ∀ϵ n > 0. We are also interested in finding the rate pairs at which the two messages can be communicated securely. We assume that a passive eavesdropper wiretaps one channel, which one exactly is not known 1 . This assumption is equivalent to have one Eve on every link, but these do not cooperate among themselves. We let Z n e , e ∈ E be the symbol received by Eve on edge e over n channel uses. Clearly, X ei = Y ei = Z ei , ∀i ∈ [1 : n]. We assume that for j ∈ [1 : 2], S j has an independent and infinite source of randomness Θ j . Definition 2. A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be securely achievable if there exist a block length n, a set of encoding functions f e , ∀e ∈ E, such that with i ∈ [1 : 2] 1 The case of Eve wiretapping two or more edges is trivial as this would always give the complete message knowledge of at least one source to Eve. and a set of two decoding functions ϕ j for j ∈ [1 : 2] , such that destination D j can reliably decode the message W j (see Definition 1) and such that ∀e ∈ E and ∀ϵ n > 0 I (W 1 , W 2 ; Z n e ) < ϵ n (strong secrecy requirement).
III. MAIN RESULT
We derive the capacity region with and without security constraints for the four 2-unicast networks reported in Table I. In particular: (i) the network in Fig. 1 is the classical butterfly network, which we refer to as butterfly network 1; (ii) the network in Fig. 4 is a modified version of the classical butterfly network, which we refer to as butterfly network 2; (iii) the network in Fig. 2 is a particular case of the butterfly networks in Fig. 1 and Fig. 4 (with the role of C 4 and C 5 swapped) when the sources are co-located; (iv) the network in Fig. 3 is a particular case of the butterfly networks in Fig. 1 and Fig. 4 when the destinations are co-located. It is worth noting that when the two sources in Fig. 1 are merged to get the network in Fig. 2 , the source is connected to M 1 through two parallel edges of capacities C 1 and C 2 . We replaced these two parallel edges by one edge of capacity C 1 + C 2 ; while this operation is without loss of generality if there are no security constraints, it might be with loss of optimality under security considerations, since the eavesdropper can now wiretap an edge of capacity C 1 + C 2 , which is not possible in the case of parallel edges. However, our outer bounds (proved to be tight) are derived by considering the case where the eavesdropper never wiretaps the edge of capacity C 1 + C 2 . Hence, this operation is without loss of generality also under security considerations. A similar argument holds for the case of co-located sinks, i.e., the two parallel edges of capacity C 6 and C 7 can be safely replaced by one edge of capacity C 6 + C 7 . Table I also reports, for each network, the capacity regions with and without security constraints, which are derived in the rest of this section. Moreover, Table I highlights if coding operations were needed to characterize the capacity. We remark here that the proposed capacity-achieving schemes make use of three types of coding operations: (i) in case of unsecure communication, similar to the multicast case, message packets are mixed together; in particular, the amount of packets that are mixed depends on the edge capacities; (ii) in case of secure communication, the same secret key can be used by two different sessions; (iii) secret keys and message packets are mixed together during the encryption process for secure communication; notice that this coding operation is always needed for ensuring security and hence we do not report this in Table I .
A. Butterfly Network 1
We start by considering the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 without security constraints. We notice that the rate region in (1) is an outer bound on the capacity region of the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 since: (i) the single rate constraints in (1a) and (1b) are cut-constraints (from the max-flow mincut theorem) and (ii) the sum-rate constraints in (1c) and (1d) follow from the generalized network sharing outer bound 
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in [13, Theorem 2] . We now show that the rate region in (1) is achievable. In particular, Theorem III.1. For the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 , the following rate region is achievable:
It is not difficult to see that the rate regions in (8) and (1) are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (1) is the capacity region for the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 .
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume R 1 ≤ R 2 . Consider the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (8) . The scheme is as follows.
• S i , i ∈ [1 : 2] sends R i packets on edge i, which is possible thanks to the constraints in (8a) and (8b). • M 1 is responsible of two operations: (i) it first merges min {R 1 , C 4 , C 5 } packets received from S 1 with the same amount of packets received from S 2 (possible since R 1 ≤ R 2 ); after this operation there are min {R 1 , C 4 , C 5 } mixed packets and
(ii) it then sends both these types of messages (i.e., coded and uncoded) on edge 3, which is possible thanks to the constraint in (8c). • M 2 on edge 6 (respectively, edge 7) sends
uncoded packets that were transmitted by S 2 (respectively, S 1 ) and on edges 6 and 7 all the min {R 1 , C 4 , C 5 } mixed packets received from M 1 ; this is possible thanks to the constraints in (8a) and (8b). • S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) on edge 4 (respectively, 5) sends the min {R 1 , C 4 , C 5 } packets that were mixed at M 1 ; this is possible since min
with the same number of packets of S 2 -also received (uncoded) on edge 5. Thus, D 1 can recover the packets of S 1 from the coded packets received on edge 7. Similarly, D 2 can decode all the packets that were sent by S 2 .
We now consider the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1 with security constraints. In particular (the proof of Theorem III.2 can be found in [12] ), Theorem III.2. For the butterfly network 1 in Fig. 1, secure communication is not possible.
B. Butterfly Network with Co-Located Sources
We consider the butterfly network with co-located sources in Fig. 2 with no security constraints. The rate region in (2) is an outer bound on the capacity region of the network in Fig. 2 since all the rate constraints are cut-constraints. We now show that the rate region in (2) is achievable. In particular, Theorem III.3. For the butterfly network with co-located sources in Fig. 2 , the following rate region is achievable:
It is not difficult to see that the regions in (9) and (2) are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (2) is the capacity region for the butterfly network with co-located sources in Fig. 2 .
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (9) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• The source sends min {R 1 , C 5 } packets for D 1 on edge 5, possible since min {R 1 , C 5 } ≤ C 5 . Similarly, the source sends min {R 2 , C 4 } packets for D 2 on edge 4. On the link of capacity (C 1 + C 2 ), then the source sends R 1 −min {R 1 , C 5 } packets for D 1 and R 2 −min {R 2 , C 4 } packets for D 2 (possible thanks to the constraint in (9c)). • M 1 simply sends the R 1 − min {R 1 , C 5 } packets for D 1 and the R 2 − min {R 2 , C 4 } packets for D 2 on edge 3, which is possible thanks to the constraint in (9c).
packets for D 1 (received from M 1 ) on edge 7, which is possible thanks to the constraint in (9a). Similarly, M 2 sends the R 2 − min {R 2 , C 4 } packets for D 2 on edge 6, which is possible thanks to the constraint in (9b). • Node D 1 (respectively, D 2 ) successfully recovers a total of useful (i.e., those the source wished to explicitly communicate to D 1 ) R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) uncoded packets.
We now consider the network in Fig. 2 with security constraints. In particular, as explained in details in what follows, the two shared (by the two sessions) edges of capacity (C 1 + C 2 ) and C 3 are used to transmit the random packets used to generate the secret keys, while edges 4 and 5 are used to transmit the encypted message packets. With this, we have Theorem III.4. For the butterfly network with co-located sources in Fig. 2 , the secure capacity region is given by (5) in Table I. Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (5) in Table I is achievable. The proof that the rate region in (5) is also an outer bound on the secure capacity region of the butterfly network with co-located sources is reported in Appendix A. Consider a secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (5) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• The source sends K = max {R 1 , R 2 } random packets on the edge of capacity C 1 + C 2 . These packets are used to generate a secret key. This operation is possible thanks to the constraints in (5a) and in (5b). • M 1 simply sends the K random packets on edge 3, which is possible thanks to the constraints in (5a) and in (5b). • M 2 sends R 1 random packets (out the K ones received from M 1 ) on edge 7, which we refer to as K 1 . Similarly, out of the K random packets received from M 1 , M 2 sends R 2 random packets on edge 6, which we refer to as K 2 (possible thanks to the constraints in (5a) and in (5b)). • The source sends R 1 message packets for D 1 encrypted with the key K 1 on edge 5 (possible because of (5a)). Similarly, it sends R 2 message packets for D 2 encrypted with the key K 2 on edge 4 (possible because of (5b)). • Node D 1 (respectively, D 2 ) receives R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) encrypted useful packets from the source on edge 5 (respectively, 4). Hence, by using the key K 1 (respectively, K 2 ) received from M 2 , D 1 (respectively, D 2 ) successfully recovers R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) uncoded packets.
C. Butterfly Network with Co-Located Sinks
We consider the butterfly network with co-located sinks as shown in Fig. 3 without security constraints. An outer bound on the capacity region of this network is the cut-set bound, which is given in (3) . We now design a transmission scheme that achieves the outer bound in (3). In particular, Theorem III.5. For the butterfly network with co-located sinks in Fig. 3 , the following rate region is achievable:
By straightforward manipulations, it is not difficult to see that the rate regions in (10) and (3) are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (3) is the capacity region for the butterfly network with co-located sinks in Fig. 3 .
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (10) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends min {R 1 , C 4 } (respectively, min {R 2 , C 5 }) packets on edge 4 (respectively, edge 5). Moreover, S 1 (respectively, We now consider the network in Fig. 3 with security constraints. As for the case of co-located sources, our capacityachieving scheme uses the two edges of capacity C 3 and (C 6 + C 7 ) to transmit the random packets used to generate the secret keys, and edges 4 and 5 to transmit the encypted message packets. However, it is not difficult to see that a scheme that uses edges 4 and 5 to transmit the keys and edges of capacity C 3 and (C 6 + C 7 ) to convey the encrypted messages is also optimal, i.e., capacity-achieving. In particular, we have Theorem III.6. For the butterfly network with co-located sinks in Fig. 3 , the secure capacity region is given by (6) in Table I. Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (6) in Table I is achievable. The proof of the converse is provided in [12, Appendix B] . Consider a secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (6) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) random packets on edge 1 (respectively, 2). These packets are used for generating the secret key and we refer to them as K 1 (respectively, K 2 ). These operations are possible thanks to the constraints in (6a) and in (6b). S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) also sends R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) message packets encrypted with K 1 (respectively, K 2 ) on edge 4 (respectively, 5) -possible thanks to (6a) and (6b). • M 1 and M 2 simply send the R 1 + R 2 random packets on edge 3 and on the edge of capacity C 6 + C 7 , respectively. This is possible because of the constraint in (6c). • The destination receives R 1 encrypted packets of S 1 on edge 4 and R 2 encrypted packets of S 2 on edge 5. It also receives the keys K 1 and K 2 on the edge of capacity C 6 + C 7 . Hence, by using K 1 and K 2 , it successfully recovers R 1 and R 2 uncoded packets of S 1 and S 2 , respectively.
D. Butterfly Network 2
The last network we consider is the buttefly network 2 in Fig. 4 , which differs from the buttefly network 1 in Fig. 1 since each source is also directly connected to the corresponding destination. The rate region in (4) is an outer bound on the capacity region of the butterfly network 2, where each constraint follows from the max-flow min-cut theorem. We now show that the rate region in (4) is achievable. In particular, Theorem III.7. For the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4 , the following rate region is achievable:
It is not difficult to see that the rate regions in (11) and (4) are equivalent. Hence, the rate region in (4) is the capacity region for the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4 .
Proof: Consider a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (11) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends min {R 1 , C 4 } (respectively, min {R 2 , C 5 }) packets on edge 4 (respectively, edge 5). Moreover, S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends R 1 − min {R 1 , C 4 } (respectively, R 2 − min {R 2 , C 5 }) packets on edge 1 (respectively, edge 2). These operations are possible thanks to the constraints in (11a) and in (11b).
min {R 2 , C 5 } packets of S 2 on edge 3, which is possible because of the constraint in (11c).
Similarly, M 2 sends R 2 − min {R 2 , C 5 } packets of S 2 on edge 6. These operations are possible thanks to the constraints in (11a) and in (11b).
uncoded packets of S 1 (respectively, S 2 ).
We now consider the network in Fig. 4 with security constraints. In particular, Theorem III.8. For the butterfly network 2 in Fig. 4 , the secure capacity region is given by (7) in Table I. Proof: We here prove that the rate region in (7) in Table I is achievable. The proof of the converse is provided in [12, Appendix C] . Consider a secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying the constraints in (7) . The transmission scheme is as follows.
• Source S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) random packets on edge 1 (respectively, 2). These packets are used in the secret key generation and we refer to them as K 1 (respectively, K 2 ). Moreover, S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) sends R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) message packets encrypted with the key K 1 (respectively, K 2 ) on edge 4 (respectively, 5). These operations are possible thanks to the constraints in (7a) and in (7b). • M 1 simply sends the R 1 + R 2 random packets (K 1 and K 2 ) on edge 3. This operation is possible because of (7c). • M 2 sends the R 1 random packets of S 1 (K 1 ) on edge 7 and the R 2 random packets of S 2 (K 2 ) on edge 6 (possible thanks to the constraints in (7a) and (7b)). • The destination D 1 (respectively, D 2 ) receives R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) encrypted message packets of S 1 (respectively, S 2 ). It also receives the key K 1 (respectively, K 2 ) on edge 7 (respectively, 6). Hence, by using K 1 (respectively, K 2 ), it successfully decodes R 1 (respectively, R 2 ) uncoded packets of S 1 (respectively, S 2 ).
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We characterized the capacity of four two unicast networks derived from the butterfly network. In particular, we analyzed these networks with and without security constraints.
We now consider the networks in Table I with edge capacities equal to C and R 1 = R 2 = R. With this assumption, based on our analysis, we can draw the following conclusions.
• There exist networks for which network coding operations are needed (for capacity characterization) in absence of security, but they do not provide any benefit under security constraints (see butterfly network 1). • There are networks for which coding across sessions is not beneficial without security, but it becomes crucial with security considerations. For example, consider the butterfly network with co-located sources. In this case, it is not difficult to see that, if we simply timeshare across the two sessions, then we get R ≤ C 2 , i.e., edge 3 is the bottleneck. However, by using the coding operation (ii) (i.e., the same secret key can be used by the two sessions), we obtain R ≤ C, i.e., we can transmit at a double rate. • We observe that secure communication can incur significant rate losses with respect to the unsecure counterpart. The rate losses can be quantified as: (i) 100% for the butterfly network 1 (since secure communication is not possible); (ii) more than 33% for the case of co-located sources (since R ≤ 3 2 C without security and R ≤ C with security); (iii) more than 66% for the case of co-located destinations and butterfly network 2 (since R ≤ 3 2 C without security and R ≤ C 2 with security). • For unsecure communication, cooperation among sources and sinks offers a rate gain of 50% over butterfly network 1. This gain is due to an increase in the min-cut values, which are tight and evaluate to R ≤ C in the butterfly network 1 and to R ≤ 3 2 C in the cases of colocated sources and sinks. However, butterfly network 2 already has an achievable min-cut of R ≤ 3 2 C and thus cooperation does not offer benefits over this network. • Under security considerations, the case of co-located sources (i.e., R ≤ C) brings higher throughput gains than the co-located sinks counterpart (R ≤ C 2 ). This is because in the former case, coding opportunities arise, i.e., the same key can be used by the two sessions. Moreover, thanks to the multipath diversity, the two co-located cases enable secure communication, which was not possible over the butterfly network 1. Regarding the butterfly network 2 the case of co-located sources brings secure rate advantages thanks to the cooperation. Actually, for both the butterfly network 2 and the case of co-located sources the min-cut values evaluate to R ≤ 3 2 C, but the secure rate achieved in the former case, i.e., R ≤ C 2 , is half the one achieved in the latter case, i.e., R ≤ C.
In this paper we explored secure network coding schemes for two unicast sessions over butterfly-like error-free networks. We found that cooperation across the two unicast sessions is beneficial in the case where the same random packets can be leveraged by both destinations to create secure keys. This can be implemented by connecting the sources to each other. We here analyzed the case when the cooperation edges are not a bottleneck for the communication, here modeled by an undirected link of infinite capacity. Understanding how the rate advantages change with respect to the strength of the cooperation link when this is the min-cut is an open question. It is also an open question how to extend these results to larger networks. We believe that the results we derived for the butterfly topologies represent a first step towards this direction; for instance, we could envisage transmission schemes that utilize butterfly networks as building blocks. ≤ H (Y n 7 ) + nϵ n + ϵ n ≤ nC 7 + nϵ n + ϵ n , where: (a) is due to the strong secrecy requirement; (b) is due to the decodability constraint; (c) follows because the entropy of a discrete random variable is non-negative; (d) is due to the 'conditioning reduces the entropy' principle.
In the above derivation by substituting: (i) the subscript 5 with 7 and vice versa, one can get nR 1 ≤ nC 5 +nϵ n +ϵ n ; (ii) the subscript 7 with 3 and since Y n 7 is a deterministic function of Y n 3 , one can get nR 1 ≤ nC 3 +nϵ n +ϵ n (see [12, Appendix A]); (iii) the subscript 7 with 2 and since Y n 3 is a deterministic function of Y n 2 and Y n 7 is a deterministic function of Y n 3 , one can get nR 1 ≤ n (C 1 +C 2 )+nϵ n +ϵ n (see [12, Appendix A]).
By dividing both sides of the above inequalities by n and by taking the limit for n → ∞, we get the constraint in (5a). By following similar steps, one can derive the constraint in (5b).
